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Abstract: 
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eclectic blend of the supply-side account of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) with a 
demand recession triggered by balance sheet effects (Krugman, 1999). This sharpens the 
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SUPPLY SHOCKS AND CURRENCY CRISES: THE POLICY 
DILEMMA RECONSIDERED* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The “third generation” approach developed by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), 
hereafter ABB, shows how liability dollarisation can trigger a fall in output as devaluation 
disrupts the supply-side of the economy; and the possibility of multiple equilibria implies a risk 
of sudden collapse in the exchange rate. Their influential analysis applies beyond the region 
of East Asia for which the model was initially developed: ‘fear of floating’ in Latin America, for 
example, is widely attributed to such balance sheet effects. 
 
By contrast, in ‘analytical afterthoughts’ on the Asian crises, Paul Krugman (1999) adopted a 
demand-side account of a small open economy to argue that “a loss of confidence by foreign 
investors can be self-justifying, because capital flight leads to a plunge in the currency, and 
the balance-sheet effects of this plunge lead to a collapse in domestic investment.”  
 
Can these two approaches be reconciled? What do the data suggest? What are the 
implications for policy? These are questions tackled in this paper. 
 
 
Some stylised facts from SE Asia 
 
 
It is sometimes said that for countries, like Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand, the 
currency crises of 1997-1998 abruptly changed the sign of the growth rate -- instead of 
growing in double figures, they contracted just as fast. Contraction typically began in the first 
two quarters after devaluation, with output reaching its lowest point within a year: the one-
year fall in GDP averaged 10%. For small open economies, it is commonly assumed that 
export demand will act promptly to stabilise overall demand in the economy. But export 
volumes in the year after devaluation grew below trend, particularly for Indonesia: so it is 
difficult to argue that exports played a stabilising role in the short run. 
 
A longer-run perspective may be obtained by plotting realised output against an estimate of 
trend potential, as Aghion and Banerjee (2005) do for Indonesia in their Clarendon Lectures. 
Repeating the exercise for Korea, Malaysia and Thailand produces similar results, with output 
falling sharply below the initial trend path estimated using pre-crisis observations; and 
recovering thereafter onto a lower trend. 
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On the Blanchard and Quah (1989) criterion, where shocks to output are classified as 
demand or supply depending on whether they are temporary or persistent, the data seem to 
indicate a severe supply shock. But would supply-side effects set in so rapidly? And with such 
magnitude? In the ABB model, strictly interpreted, it is future output that falls due to a 
productivity shock (amplified it may be by reduced investment due to the crisis): but output at 
the time of crisis remains unchanged as it is predetermined by past investment. 
 
A more plausible interpretation of the data might be that the prompt initial fall in output reflects 
a temporary demand effect: while the subsequent downshift from pre- to post-crisis trend 
indicates a fall in potential supply. To accommodate this interpretation one needs to blend the 
determinants of demand and supply. This is the objective of this paper.        
 
 
Supply-side shocks and policy response  
 
ABB’s supply-side model focuses on the balance sheet effects of devaluation on the private 
sector in a small open economy. With liability dollarisation and one-period of price stickiness 
for the traded good, a rise in the price of the dollar generates adverse balance sheet effects; 
so investment is cut back, reducing productive potential in the next period. This “third 
generation” account offers a persuasive channel for the transmission of the exchange rate 
effects to the supply side; and the multiplicity of equilibria opens up the prospects of sudden 
shifts in the exchange rate.  
 
 
An attractive feature of this model is that the equilibrium can be found at the intersection of 
two schedules relating to the goods market and to the asset market (not unlike the IS and LM 
schedules of Keynesian macroeconomics - except that the goods market refers to supply). 
These are plotted with future output (on the horizontal axis) and the exchange rate in the 
crisis period, measured by the domestic currency price of a dollar (on the vertical). Aggregate 
supply, the S-curve is, perhaps surprisingly, a decreasing function of the price of a dollar: this 
is because of the adverse balance-sheet effects of liability dollarisation on investment. (There 
is, however, a floor to the level of output reached in recession.) Asset market equilibrium is 
also decreasing in the exchange rate, and captures the impact of foreign interest rates and 
post-crisis monetary policy. (Some factors impact on both schedules: the increase of interest 
rate when the shock occurs, for example.) The intersection of these two curves defines 
equilibrium: but, because they are non linear, multiple equilibria can occur.  
 
These schedules highlight the dilemma faced by policy-makers after a significant, 
unanticipated decline in the productivity which reduces aggregate supply and threatens 
recession with currency collapse (where the economy is in recession and asset market 
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equilibrium occurs at a greatly devalued rate against the dollar). “What is the best monetary 
policy response to such a shock, if the objective is to limit the output decline and more 
importantly, to avoid a currency crisis?” ask ABB. They reply that “A standard 
recommendation (the IMF position) is to increase the interest rate”; and they observe that this 
shifts asset market equilibrium in line with the contraction of aggregate supply, so as to check 
the fall in the currency and the economy. Unfortunately high interest rates induce a further 
contraction of aggregate supply: so tight money is chasing a moving target. ABB go on to 
provide a condition that ensures that higher interest rates during the crisis will avoid recession 
and deliver a new equilibrium. (This condition requires that debt be largely denominated in 
foreign currency and that rising interest rate does not substantially reduce the credit available 
for investment.) 
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 Allowing for demand failure -- and “twin crisis” 
  
The ABB analysis assumes that there is no aggregate demand failure resulting from the 
productivity shock. The demand for exports of a small open economy is typically assumed to 
be unlimited: so export demand would, in theory, provide an automatic stabiliser. But, as we 
have seen, the data do not support this.  
 
To modify the supply-side approach and allow for demand contraction, the obvious step is to 
incorporate a multiplier effect of depressed investment on GDP, taking exports as pre-
determined in the short run. In support of this Keynesian specification of demand 
determination, note that firms are in any case credit-constrained in the ABB model; and that, if 
devaluation is accompanied by a banking crisis (“twin crises”), both consumers and producers 
will typically be denied access to new credit. 
 
In the main text, we plot this in a graph with aggregate demand at the time of crisis shown as 
a decreasing function of the exchange rate (because of balance sheet effects); and we 
discuss how this aggregate demand curve will shift will contract further in a “twin crisis”. 
 
 When is it safe to raise interest rates in a crisis? 
 
 
It is safe to raise the domestic interest rate to strengthen the currency only if the negative 
impact on aggregate supply is relatively small. When output in the crisis is demand-
determined, however, increasing the interest rate will have a greater negative impact on 
supply than ABB allow for. So the efficacy of tight money for defending the currency is 
weakened. Showing that current monetary tightening would stabilise the exchange rate 
assuming full employment is no guarantee that it will do so when demand collapses.  
 
 
The challenge for policy 
 
What if the condition for tight money to work at full employment is satisfied, but will fail if there 
is demand deficiency? Is recession inevitable? Our answer proceeds in a round-about 
fashion. We show initially that the first-best policy is to tighten money in the future and not 
when the shock occurs. Assuming this is ruled out, we consider how high interest rates in the 
crisis may be complemented by fiscal easing to maintain demand. Then we discuss policy 
options to protect the supply-side from the adverse effect of high interest rates. 
 
To show that tightening future money is an appropriate policy in the ABB model is 
straightforward. Absent demand failure, the shock has no effect on current output, but lowers 
future output, so future money must be lowered in line with reduced supply to avoid a future 
fall in the currency. The effect is to contract the asset market schedule to the left in line with 
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the aggregate supply without the second round effects of raising interest rates in the crisis. 
So, in principle, output will contract in line with productivity at the pre-existing exchange rate. 
But this policy involves doing nothing in the crisis, while promising to take action in the future! 
So it may not be credible. Assume that this first-best policy is not implemented, and interest 
rates are raised at the time of the shock. What about the risk of demand collapse?  
  
(i)Maintaining demand 
 
The dilemma for the monetary policy arises from having two objectives – to strengthen the 
currency and protect the economy – with only one instrument, the nominal interest rate. 
Tinbergen’s principle would suggest looking for another policy instrument. What if tight money 
is complemented by an easing of fiscal policy? The logic in support of this is straightforward. If 
fiscal policy is used to stabilise aggregate demand in the way that exports would have (if they 
had time to adjust), then there will be no demand shortfall and ABB’s analysis applies. 
 
So we conclude that the condition derived by ABB is appropriate either if demand for the 
output of a small open economy in crisis is inherently stable, or if fiscal policy action is taken 
to achieve the same result. Otherwise, there is a clear risk that unmitigated tight money will 
cause serious recession. Is this not the point being made by observers – like Joseph Stiglitz – 
who criticised the IMF policy recommendation of tight money and tight fiscal policy in the 
midst of the East Asia crisis? 
  
 
 
(ii) Protecting supply  
 
Demand stabilisation in a crisis may help avoid recession but the outcome is still second best: 
high interest rates have undesirable supply-side effects that were in principle avoided by the 
first-best monetary policy discussed above. Can one get to first-best despite raising interest 
rates?  There are policy initiatives that should help. 
 
(a) Emergency credit and/or fiscal transfers to stabilise aggregate supply 
 
 Given that the firms are credit-constrained, increasing cash flow could also help. Thus the 
government could try to ensure that banks keep current credit lines open; or it could provide 
temporary finance itself, e.g. extra lending via an emergency government loan programme 
might be considered.  
If firms still want to invest despite the high interest rates, fiscal devices in the form of 
temporary investment allowances and/ or accelerated depreciation might be used. To protect 
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commercial firms from the higher cost of borrowing, interest rate subsidies could be 
employed. 
 
(b) Capital controls to protect the currency 
 
An alternative policy is to drive a wedge between the rate needed to reassure external 
investors and the domestic rate relevant to corporate investment by imposing temporary 
controls on capital, as recommended on a temporary basis by Paul Krugman in an ‘Open 
letter to President Mahatir’ in September 1998. Krugman’s article in Fortune was entitled ‘It’s 
Time to Get Radical’ because the IMF at that time was very much committed to capital 
account liberalisation.  
 
A creditor standstill was implemented in Korea in December 1997, for example, when IMF 
and G7 funding was insufficient to meet anticipated withdrawals until key banks were 
persuaded to rollover their credit lines. But it was Malaysia that put Krugman’s counsel to the 
test; with results reckoned ex post to be positive.  
 
In principle, temporary capital controls could be used to implement the first-best monetary 
policy. Assuming that, in the period of the crisis, the announcement of future tight money is 
not credible, higher interest rates for overseas investors in domestic currency would normally 
be needed to keep the current value of the dollar below its (higher) future expected level. But 
the domestic economy can be protected from rising interest rates by capital controls which tax 
the proceeds of investing in dollars, see chapter 5 of the Clarendon lectures by Aghion and 
Banerjee for further discussion. 
 
Capital account liberalisation allows for high speed movements; such controls act like 
emergency brakes. Whether governments can switch capital controls on and off in this 
fashion without losing credibility is an interesting question, on which the East Asian 
experience may throw some light. 
 
(c) Debt restructuring to offset adverse balance sheet effects 
 
As the dollar-denomination of debt lies at the heart of the balance sheet problem for private 
firms, relieving them of this debt burden should help. In terms of the model being discussed, it 
is dollarisation of corporate debt that gives a negative slope to the S-curve: consequently de-
dollarisation makes the S-curve vertical, i.e. independent of the price of the dollar, and 
reduces the risk of financial collapse.  
 
 
Alternative perspectives  
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Imagine, nonetheless, that the necessary demand management policies had in fact been put 
in place. The result could have been the delayed step-down shown in potential supply, 
without the immediate drop in output. But there are other possibilities that could be 
considered in future research. First that insulating domestic capital markets may help ensure 
macroeconomic stability; second that this may be at the cost of lower long-run growth. Both 
possibilities are illustrated in the paper using GDP data from India.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2000) trace the impact of devaluation on domestic 
investment and the supply-side of the economy via the balance sheets of credit-constrained 
firms: and the possibility of self-fulfilling crisis they uncover could help explain why many 
emerging markets live in “fear of floating”. Exclusive focus on supply-side economic 
contraction is an unnecessary limitation of their analysis. Demand failure may also be part of 
the story, due to a lag in export demand substituting for a falling investment orders in the 
midst of  regional turmoil, for example; or to a credit crunch for a country suffering a ‘twin 
crisis’.  
 
If this is the case, Tinbergen’s principle suggests complementing tight money with fiscal 
easing to maintain demand. In fact, first best policy in the ABB model requires credible 
promises of future tight money without high interest rates during the crisis. If this is not 
credible, fiscal and financial transfers and capital controls may be appropriate to shield the 
domestic economy from the impact of high rates. Here again we are appealing to Tinbergen’s 
principle, not arguing for lax monetary policy.  
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Supply shocks and currency crises: the policy dilemma reconsidered 
 
Introduction 
 
Key features of recent currency crises include a sharp output contraction coming hard on the 
heels of devaluation and the adverse effects of liability dollarisation threatening the solvency 
of commercial enterprises. The “third generation” approach developed by Aghion, Bacchetta 
and Banerjee (2000), hereafter ABB, demonstrates how liability dollarisation can trigger a fall 
in output as devaluation disrupts the supply-side of the economy;1 and the possibility of 
multiple equilibria implies a risk of sudden collapse in the exchange rate. Their influential 
analysis applies beyond the region of East Asia for which the model was initially developed: 
‘fear of floating’ in Latin America, for example, is widely attributed to such balance sheet 
effects, Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Calvo et al. (2003). 
 
By contrast, in ‘analytical afterthoughts’ on the Asian crises, Paul Krugman (1999) adopted a 
demand-side account of a small open economy to argue that “a loss of confidence by foreign 
investors can be self-justifying, because capital flight leads to a plunge in the currency, and 
the balance-sheet effects of this plunge lead to a collapse in domestic investment.” In a more 
detailed framework, Céspedes et al. (2003) have shown that devaluation can lead to demand 
contraction in a highly-dollarised open economy, where adverse balance-sheet effects 
overwhelm gains in trade-competitiveness. 
 
What do the data suggest? Can these two approaches be reconciled? What are the 
implications for policy? These are questions tackled in this paper. The data for South East 
Asia (SE-Asia) reviewed in the first section suggest that financial crises affect both demand 
and supply. The former shows up as a prompt of contraction output: the latter as a down-shift 
in the trend path of potential GDP. Assessing the adequacy of policy can only be conducted 
when both supply and demand are taken into account. If demand is at risk, a key part of 
financial management will be to maintain demand. 
 
Exchange rate crises often face monetary policy-makers with a cruel dilemma: whether to 
raise interest rates to save the currency from collapse or to lower them to maintain investment 
and future output. In section 2, the policy dilemma that follows from an adverse productivity 
shock is illustrated using ABB’s graphical approach. In section 3 we outline an eclectic 
alternative framework that incorporates the demand effects of an exchange rate crisis and of 
a credit crunch. When is it appropriate to raise interest rates in a crisis? In section 4, we 
present the condition given by ABB and indicate how it is affected by demand recession. After 
discussing first-best policy in section 5, we consider how high interest rates in the crises may 
                                                 
1 While our analysis focuses on their initial basic model, notice is taken of subsequent developments 
published by the same authors wherever this is relevant. 
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be complemented by fiscal easing to maintain demand. We then discuss policy options to 
protect the supply-side from the adverse effect of high interest rates. After a brief 
consideration of alternative perspectives, suggested by data from India, the paper concludes. 
 
 
1. Stylised facts of crises in South East Asia  
 
The pattern of output contraction following sharp falls in the real exchange rate in four of the 
crisis countries in SE-Asia is shown in Figure 1, which plots GDP over 4 years for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Korea and Thailand2. (The data are time-shifted to centre on the quarter before 
devaluation occurred, labelled as period 0; and output volumes in period 0 are normalised to 
100.) Contraction typically begins in the two quarters following devaluation; and GDP reaches 
its lowest point within a year.  
 
 
 
 
It is sometimes said that, for these countries, currency crisis abruptly changed the sign of the 
growth rate. The year-on-year fall I n GDP in the four countries under discussion 
averages 10%, see Table 1, column 1.  
 
                                                 
2 ABB cite Korea and Thailand as two possible case studies of their model. 
80 
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INDONESIA 99.15 100 104.23 105.74 95.9 85.48 87.05 87.48 88.87 88.22
KOREA 89.39 90.12 92.06 93.03 95.2 96.96 96.21 98.66 100 99.95 91.5 90.87 91.97 93.38 96.44 99.69 102.01
MALAYSIA 85.01 86.2 87.99 90.83 92.3 94.91 96.89 97.52 100 101.93 102.96 96.07 94.09 91.37 91.24 95.15 98.59
THAILAND 94.56 93.7 93.54 95.21 100.57 100.86 98 96.19 100 99.27 93.76 89.23 86.46 85.76 86.81 89.04 89.36
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Devaluation
Figure 1: GDP in SE Asia (quarterly)
Source: IMF:IFS.  Note: the data are time-shifted to centre on the quarter before devaluation occurred, labelled as period 0; and output volumes in period 0 are normalised to 100. 
                            Seasonally adjusted using the independent pre-crisis and post-crisis trend lines shown for calculating residuals (excluding crisis-affected period from Q1 to Q4) 
Q1= 1997Q3 (Indonesia, Malaysia  and Thailand) and 1997Q4 (Korea)
Contraction begins within two quarters  
Indonesia
Thailand
Korea 
Malaysia 
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Table 1: Falling Tigers: Changes in GDP and exports, 1997-1998 
 Real GDP growth Growth in export volume 
 1997-1998 Pre-crisis 
Trend 
1997-1998 Pre-crisis Trend 
Indonesia -13% 7% -7% 6%
Korea -7% 7% 19% 13%
Malaysia -7% 9% 7% 13%
Thailand -11% 8% 8% 16%
AVERAGE (unweighted) -10% 7.75% 7% 12%
Source: IMF:IFS. 
 
For small open economies it is commonly assumed that exports will act promptly to stabilise 
overall demand in the economy. In volume terms, on average exports from SE Asia continued 
to grow year-on-year -- but below trend. This was clearly not enough to offset the collapse of 
domestic demand, particularly in the case of Indonesia, see Table 1. 
 
A longer-run perspective of the impact of crises may be obtained by plotting realised output 
against an estimate of trend potential. This is what Aghion and Banerjee (2005) do for 
Indonesia in their Clarendon Lectures, using estimates of potential supply from Griffith-Jones 
and Gottschalk (2004). Repeating the exercise for Korea produces similar results, as shown 
in Figure 2, with the initial trend path (estimated using pre-crisis observations) labelled SS: 
output falls sharply, and then recovers to a lower trend path shown as S’S’. A matching 
analysis for Malaysia and Thailand, two other countries mentioned in ABB, is provided in 
Appendix A.  
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Figure 2: Shocks to demand and supply: the Korean case.
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors). Seasonally adjusted using the independent pre-crisis 
and post-crisis trend lines shown for calculating residuals (excluding crisis-affected period from 1997 Q4 to 1998 Q3).
Devaluation
 
 
How is this data to be interpreted in terms of demand and supply? On the Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) criterion, where shocks to output are classified as demand or supply depending 
 13
on whether they are temporary or persistent, the Korean data in Figure 2 would seem to 
indicate a severe supply-side shock. But would supply-side effects set in so rapidly? And with 
such magnitude? In the ABB model, moreover, it is future output that falls due to a 
productivity shock (amplified it may be by reduced investment due to the crisis): but output at 
the time of crisis remains unchanged as it is predetermined by past investment and 
productivity.  
 
A more plausible interpretation of the data in Figure 2 might be that the prompt initial fall in 
output reflects a temporary demand effect3: while the subsequent downshift from pre- to post-
crisis trend indicates a fall in potential supply. To accommodate this interpretation, 
represented in highly stylised fashion in the Figure, one needs to blend the determinants of 
demand and supply. This is the objective of this paper. 
 
2. Supply-side shocks and policy response  
 
Policy makers in East Asia faced a cruel dilemma: whether to raise interest rates to reassure 
foreign investors or to lower them in order to protect domestic industry.4 This policy dilemma 
is analysed by ABB who provide a formal condition which ensures that increasing domestic 
interest rates5 will avoid collapse. Is their analysis robust to fluctuations in demand? After 
allowing for demand contraction, we find a new, more restrictive, condition. Before discussing 
this and its policy implications, we briefly describe the ABB model and how it illuminates the 
policy dilemma. 
 
Theirs is a dynamic supply-side model which focuses on the balance sheet effects of 
devaluation on the private sector in a small open economy. With liability dollarisation and one-
period of price stickiness for the traded good, a rise in the price of the dollar generates 
adverse balance sheet effects; so investment is cut back, reducing productive potential in the 
next period. This “third generation” account offers a persuasive channel for the transmission 
of the exchange rate effects to the supply side; and the multiplicity of equilibria opens up the 
prospects of sudden shifts in the exchange rate. Key features of this widely cited two-period 
model may be summarised as follows.6 
 
                                                 
3For Thailand, for example, Fischer (2001, Chapter 1, p.14)  notes  that “it became clear during 
September and October 1997 that the crisis was taking a much greater toll on aggregate demand than 
had previously been expected.” (Italics added.) 
4 It has also surfaced elsewhere: in Brazil in 2002 when markets took fright at the prospect of a Left-
wing president to cite but one instance. 
5 In a later paper, the authors argue that "the correct policy response in this case is obviously to increase 
the interest rate i1 and/or decrease M2 so that the IPLM curve shifts downward." ABB (2001, p. 1141). 
We explore this possibility in Appendix C. 
6 The relevant equations are given in Appendix B. 
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There is full capital mobility and uncovered interest parity holds. Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) for traded goods also holds, except in period 1 when an unanticipated shock leads to a 
deviation as prices are preset, but other variables — the nominal exchange rate in particular 
— are free to adjust. The actual timing of events in period 1 is: the price of traded output is 
pre-set according to the ex-ante PPP condition and firms invest; then there is an 
unanticipated shock7, followed by the adjustment of interest rate and the exchange rate; 
finally, output and profits are generated, with a fraction of retained earnings saved for 
investment in period 2. Together with investment funded by lending, this determines the level 
of production in the second period, when prices are flexible so PPP is restored.  
 
An attractive feature of this model is that the equilibrium can be found as the intersection of 
two schedules relating output and the exchange rate as in Figure 3. (Note that output is 
lagged one period behind the exchange rate, measured by the domestic currency price of a 
dollar; and that we have taken the liberty of using the more suggestive labels SS and MM in 
place of the labels W and IPLM in ABB.) First is aggregate supply, the S-curve, sloping 
downwards from a floor level at YR: this incorporates the adverse balance-sheet effects of 
liability dollarisation on investment and reflects the impact of productivity shocks. Second is 
asset market equilibrium, the M-curve, which captures the impact of foreign interest rates and 
post-crisis monetary policy. (Some factors impact on both schedules: the increase in interest 
rates when the shock occurs, for example.) The intersection of these two curves defines 
equilibrium, as shown at point A in the Figure.  
 
These schedules highlight the dilemma faced by policy-makers after a significant, 
unanticipated decline in productivity. The negative shock moves SS down to S’S’ threatening 
to lead to recession at D in Figure 3, where the M-curve intersects the floor on output denoted 
YR. “What is the best monetary policy response to such a shock, if the objective is to limit the 
output decline and more importantly, to avoid a currency crisis?” ask ABB (2000, p. 736). 
Their answer is that “A standard recommendation (the IMF position) is to increase the interest 
rate … this shifts down the Asset Market curve”. As this induces a further contraction of 
supply, however, S’S’ shifts further to the left. ABB go on to provide a condition that ensures 
that the M-curve moves to the left more than the S-curve as interest rates increase: if 
satisfied, higher interest rates will avoid recession and deliver equilibrium at a point such as B 
on S’’S’’. 
                                                 
7 If the shock is anticipated, the expected price adjustment eliminates the balance sheet effect, Becker 
(2006). 
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Figure 3: A supply shock with monetary tightening
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3. Allowing for demand failure -- and “twin crisis” 
  
The ABB analysis assumes that there is no aggregate demand failure resulting from the 
productivity shock. Investment may fall due to balance sheet effects, but this does not affect 
output at the time of the currency crisis. The demand for exports of a small open economy is 
typically assumed to be unlimited: so export demand would, in theory, provide an automatic 
stabiliser. The data, however, do not support this. Calvo and Reinhart (2000), for example, 
find that in the case of an emerging market currency crisis, exports typically fall before 
recovering to their pre-crisis levels: the lag before recovery is 8 months or, with a banking 
crisis, 20 months. In an investigation of devaluations in emerging economies, Frankel (2005, 
p.157) concludes “that devaluation is contractionary, at least in the first year, and perhaps in 
the second as well.” These observations, together with the data in Figure 1 above, suggest 
that excess supply may indeed be a problem at least in the short run. 
 
To modify the supply-side approach and allow for demand contraction, the obvious step is to 
incorporate a multiplier effect of depressed investment on GDP, taking exports as pre-
determined in the short run. To further justify the assumption that exports are slow to respond, 
note that the crisis in East Asia was spread across the region: so nearby markets were in no 
position to absorb extra exports. Other factors include contract lags and physical capacity 
constraints: the export response to the spectacular fall of the Indonesian currency in 1997/98 
was considerably hampered by lack of container shipping capacity, for example. In support of 
the Keynesian specification of demand determination, note that firms are in any case credit-
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constrained in the ABB model; and that if devaluation is accompanied by a banking crisis 
(“twin crises”), both consumers and producers will typically be denied access to new credit.  
 
With demand-determined output, the fall of investment will cut current output and 
consumption. Specifically, let output in period 1 be determined as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )* *1 0 1 1 2 1 1 11 1DY A Y D Y D X mYγβ μ β= + − + + − − + −      (1) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 1 0 1 1 11 1 /c cD E r D i E P D D= + + + −  is the total cost of debt services 
and Y1 is aggregate demand measured in constant prices. The first term, 0A , represents  
autonomous expenditure (which is not related to debt or current income). The second term 
indicates how consumption demand depends on income and debt, where β  < 1 is the labour 
share of income and γ < 1 is the fraction spent on consumption. The third term is demand for 
investment with ( )*1 1Y D− representing corporate profits net of borrowing costs, and µ the 
credit multiplier. The last two terms represent net exports, where export volumes are 
assumed fixed in the current period while imports vary proportionally with current income.  
 
The failure of export volumes to stabilise demand means that a collapse of investment (due to 
balance sheet effects, for example) can reduce realized output in the current period (as well 
as supply potential in the next period), as can be seen from the solution for current output: 
 
 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
*
0 1 1 2 1
1
2 1
1 1
1 1 1
D
A X D E i
Y
m i
γβ μ β
γβ μ β
⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎣ ⎦= =⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎣ ⎦
*
0 1
11
SA X D Y
m
ξ
ξ
+ − <− +    (2) 
 
where ξ = ( )( )11 1tγβ μ β++ + −  and 1 > 1 − ξ + m > 0, and 1SY is the aggregate supply in 
the same period. The predetermined factors in the numerator include debt service and 
exports volumes; and the term ( )1/ 1 mξ− +  is a Keynesian-style multiplier, where 1-ξ is the 
marginal propensity to save and m is the marginal propensity to import. 
 
How demand failure can lead to prompt contractionary devaluation is indicated in Figure 4, 
with output in period 1 on the horizontal axis and the exchange rate in period 1 on the vertical. 
As it depends on output and interest rate in the previous period, aggregate supply appears as 
a vertical line 1
SY . Aggregate demand, however, moves inversely with the current exchange 
rate due to the adverse balance-sheet effects of a devaluation which raises the price of a 
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dollar from E0 to E1 and increases ( )*1 1D E in equation (2). At E1, for example, demand has 
fallen by AB.  
 
AB
Output
Exchange rate
C
YR
Aggregate supply
E0
E1
Aggregate demand
Balance sheet 
effect
Devaluation
Credit 
crunch
Figure 4: Aggregate demand and supply in period 1.
YS
YD
 
 
In a “twin crisis”, devaluation will be accompanied by demand failure as the credit crunch will 
reduce the multiplier ( )2 1iμ in equation (2) and shift the aggregate demand schedule further 
to the left, as shown by the dotted line in the Figure.8 So output could fall to C at E1. As for the 
effects of raising interest rates to defend the exchange rate, they are demand-contractionary:  
an increase in the period 1 interest rate will reduce 1
DY   as high interest rates impact 
adversely on the credit multiplier and so on investment.  
 
In Table 2 we compare and contrast the standard ABB model, where output is supply-
determined, with what occurs when exports are predetermined. For ABB, an adverse 
devaluation-induced shock to the balance sheet in period 1 has no effect on period 1 output 
(which is determined by previous period investment), but cuts it in period 2 via reduced capital 
accumulation, see column 1. 
 
                                                 
8 Becker (2006) discusses the conditions under which a credit crunch will reduce output in this context. 
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Table 2: How demand recession modifies output levels. 9 
 ABB’s Model Our modification 
Y1 ( ) ( ) *1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1
( ) 1 1
( )
S
S D
Y A B B i Y D
Y Y A B B Y
σ μ α ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= =
 
( )( ) ( )*1 1
0
1 1 1 1
1 1
        
( )
D
t t t
t
D S S
Y Y D
A X mY
Y Y Y Y ABB
γβ μ β+⎡ ⎤= + + − − +⎣ ⎦
+ + −
= < =
 
Y2 ( ) ( ) *2 2 1 1 1( ) 1 1SY A B B i Y Dσ μ α ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 2 2 2
( )D S SY Y Y ABB= <  
 
 
When there is excess supply in period 1, however, the impact of an anticipated currency 
collapse is more immediate and more damaging. Balance-sheet effects reduce investment in 
period 1 directly: but this triggers a contraction of income within the period, which in turn leads 
to even less investment as profits fall. The knock-on effect on period 2 means that future 
supply is less than predicted by the ABB model.10 
 
An important issue addressed in the Clarendon lectures is whether the effect of high rates on 
bank lending will be offset by the anticipated adjustment of prices – whether ( )2 1iμ  should 
depend on the nominal or the real rate of interest. In theory, adjusting the nominal rate for 
expected inflation when price stickiness ends, will drastically diminish the prospect of crisis. In 
practice, however, nominal rates in crisis countries were pushed to extraordinarily high levels, 
much higher than subsequent inflation. When markets panic, it seems, real rates rise too and 
credit is cut back. For these reasons, we stay with the original ABB formulation where the S-
curve slopes downwards.11 
 
 
                                                 
9 Note that in table 2, we have followed ABB in assuming that output in period 2 is supply-determined. 
This does not mean that output in period 2 matches that of the ABB model, however: the contraction is 
greater because of the reduced investment associated with the fall in aggregate demand in period 1. 
10 Cutting µ1, credit multiplier corresponding to period 0, would have same effects on period 1 supply 
in both models. 
11 This is the crisis-prone intermediate case referred on pp. 1142-3 of ABB (2001): see Clarendon 
Lectures pp.117-21 for further discussion. 
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4. When is it safe to raise interest rates in a crisis? 
 
ABB provide a condition for when it is appropriate to raise interest rates in a crisis. We have 
seen graphically that it is appropriate to raise the domestic interest rate only if the negative 
impact of so doing on the S-curve is smaller than on the M-curve. Consequently, tighter 
money can lead to a non-collapse equilibrium. The formal condition, such that increasing 
interest rate 1i  will avoid collapse of the economy is: 
 
C1:         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
' * 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1
*
11 1
1 1
11 1
c c
c
Ei P Y r D i D D
P E
ii i D D
μ
μ
⎡ ⎤− + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦− < ++ + −  
 
 
see ABB (2000) page 736. So tight money is appropriate when there is substantial external 
debt and the credit multiplier is relatively insensitive to higher interest rates. 
 
But what if there is a demand recession? In fact, we find that demand-determination of output 
in period 1 alters the conditions under which high interest rates can strengthen the currency. 
A general proposition summarising this is as follows: 
 
Proposition 1 When period 1 output is demand-determined, as in (2) above, an increase in 
the period 1 interest rate will strengthen  the domestic currency less than when output is 
supply- determined. (Proof in Appendix C.) 
 
Referring back to Figure 3, note that equilibrium at point B assumes that 1 1
D SY Y= . With 
exports slow to react, however, devaluation will be contractionary for output: and the knock-on 
effect of demand failure on future potential output would shift the supply curve for period 2 to 
the left of S’’. With demand failure in period 1, there may thus be no intersection with the M’-
curve until output in period 2 falls to depression level YR  and the price of the dollar rises 
sharply, as at point C in Figure 3. In short, showing that current monetary tightening would 
stabilise the exchange rate in the absence of demand effects is no guarantee that it will do so 
when demand collapses.12 
 
When output in period 1 is demand-determined, the condition that ensures that the M-curve 
moves leftwards more that the S-curve when 1i  increases becomes: 
 
                                                 
12 Of course, if exports fail to respond sufficiently promptly, output may also fall below supply in 
period 2 as well. 
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C2: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
' * 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1
*
111 1
1 1
1
111 1
c c
c
Ei P A X r D i D D
mP E
im ii i D D
μ βγ
β βγ β μμ
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦− <⎢ ⎥ +− + − + −+ + − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
a condition clearly more restrictive than C1. 
 
 
 
5. The challenge for policy 
 
The problems posed by capital account crises are quite subtle: how to maintain confidence in 
a currency when private creditors are fleeing; and how to do this without damaging the 
economy. This will surely require appropriate action both by local policymakers and the IFIs. 
Here we focus on policy in the country affected.13 
 
This section proceeds as follows. Initially, we show that the first-best policy in response to a 
supply-side shock that reduces future output is to tighten money in the future and not when 
the shock occurs. Second we consider how high interest rates in the crises may be 
complemented by fiscal easing to maintain demand. We then discuss policy options to protect 
the supply-side from the adverse effect of high interest rates. 
 
To show that tightening future money is an appropriate policy in the ABB model is 
straightforward14. Absent demand failure, the shock has no effect on current output, but 
lowers future output. To avoid a rise in future prices - and the consequential rise in the dollar 
implied by PPP - future money must be lowered in line with reduced supply. That this will 
stabilise the exchange rate and so avoid the adverse balance sheet effects in the private 
sector can be seen from Figure 5: the new equilibrium is A’ where output contracts in line with 
the productivity shock -- but no further. Appendix D shows that the exchange rate remains 
unchanged when the leftward shift in S-curve due to adverse productivity shock is matched by 
an appropriate reduction of the future money supply (M2).  
 
                                                 
13 Woods (2006) focuses on the role of the IMF and World Bank. 
14 Notwithstanding the discussion at the end of ABB (2000, p.737), the authors observe in a later paper 
that “the correct policy response in this case is obviously to increase the interest rate i1 and/or decrease 
M2 so that the IPLM curve shifts downward.” ABB (2001, p. 1141).  
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E1=E0
Figure 5: "First-best" monetary policy
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This policy avoids at a stroke the need to raise interest rates at the time of the shock: but it 
means doing nothing in the crisis while promising to take action in the future, and this may not 
be credible. Assume that, for whatever reason, this first-best policy is not implemented, and 
interest rates are raised at the time of the shock. Will raising interest rates avoid recession?  
 
To answer this question, we use the conditions C1 and C2 derived earlier. It may be that the 
degree of dollarisation and the interest elasticity of credit are sufficiently small so that both 
conditions are satisfied, as in column 1 of Table 3, so raising interest rates will help reassure 
investors in the foreign exchange market without throwing the economy into depression. (This 
is far from first best, however, as will become apparent presently.)  
 
Table 3: Is it safe to raise interest rates (i1) in a crisis? 
 Safe Risky 
1 D SY Y
C =  
Satisfied Satisfied 
2 D SY Y
C <  
Satisfied Not satisfied 
 
What if the condition C1 elaborated by ABB (on the assumption that demand matches supply) 
is satisfied, but C2 is not satisfied, as in column 2? In this case, interest rate effects on 
demand exacerbate the contraction of Y2 sufficiently so as to rule out equilibrium above YR. Is 
this recession inevitable?  
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(i) Maintaining demand 
 
The dilemma for the monetary policy arises from having two objectives – to strengthen the 
currency and protect the economy – with only one instrument, i1. Tinbergen’s principle would 
suggest looking for another policy instrument. What if tight money is complemented by an 
easing of fiscal policy? The logic in support of this is straightforward. If fiscal policy is used to 
stabilise aggregate demand in the way that exports would have (if they had time to adjust), 
then condition C2 no longer applies, only C1: and this is satisfied by assumption.15 
 
We conclude that condition C1 derived by ABB is appropriate either if demand for the output 
of a small open economy in crisis is inherently stable, or if fiscal policy is eased sufficiently to 
achieve the same result. Otherwise, there is a clear risk that unmitigated tight money will 
cause recession. It is no surprise that IMF policy targets for fiscal tightening in the midst of the 
East Asia crisis attracted serious criticism.16 In fact, as Fischer (2001Chapter 1, p. 15) notes 
in his Robbins Lecture on ‘The First Financial Crises of the Twenty First Century’, “The 
internal debate over appropriate fiscal policy, both within the staff and with the Board [of the 
IMF], intensified as the crisis worsened, and as outside criticisms increased. By early 1998, 
budget targets began to be eased”. 
  
 
(ii) Protecting supply  
 
Demand stabilisation in a crisis may help avoid recession but the outcome is still second best: 
high interest rates have undesirable supply-side effects that were in principle avoided by the 
first-best monetary policy discussed above. Can one get to first-best despite raising interest 
rates? Let us consider policy actions to be taken at the time of crisis to maintain the supply of 
credit (and the level of investment). 
  
(b) Emergency credit and/or fiscal transfers (to stabilise the S-curve) 
  
To avoid the contraction of credit, the government could try to ensure that banks keep current 
credit lines open; or it could provide temporary finance itself, e.g. extra lending via an 
emergency government loan programme might be considered.17 Absent further shocks, such 
loans should be repaid.  
                                                 
15 In terms of equation (2), it would be autonomous demand A0 that adjusts to prevent excess supply 
instead of exports, X. 
16 See for example Stiglitz (1999). 
17 Government actions taken in Thailand to help distressed firm stay in business are discussed in 
Luangaram (2003). 
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Given that the firms are credit-constrained, increasing cash flow could also help. If firms still 
want to invest despite the high interest rates, fiscal devices in the form of temporary 
investment allowances and/or accelerated depreciation might be used. To protect commercial 
firms from the higher cost of borrowing, interest rate subsidies could be employed. Let 
11 i+ be the net-of-subsidy cost to firms that borrow in domestic currency and let 111-
i
s
+⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  be 
the gross return to lenders, and let  the subsidy s be chosen to stabilise the exchange rate i.e. 
to set E1=E0.18 Note that the supply of credit should not change if banks are aware of the 
subsidy, i.e. the credit multiplier will depend on the post subsidy of borrowing. Graphically, 
while high interest rates have moved the M-curve to the left, the impact on the S-curve has 
been avoided by the subsidy.  
  
If the adverse impact of high interest rates on current investment could be completely offset 
by financial or fiscal assistance in this way, this would ipso facto solve the problem of 
maintaining demand. To achieve first best, future money supply would also need to be 
adjusted in line with reduced supply to avoid inflation and depreciation. 
 
(b) Capital controls (to shift the M-curve) 
 
An alternative policy is to drive a wedge between the rate needed to reassure external 
investors and the domestic rate relevant to corporate investment by imposing temporary 
controls on capital, as recommended on a temporary basis by Paul Krugman in an ‘Open 
letter to President Mahatir’ in September 1998. Krugman’s article in Fortune was entitled ‘It’s 
Time to Get Radical’ because the IMF at that time was very much committed to capital 
account liberalisation. (A year earlier, for example, in September 1997 after the Thai baht had 
been devalued Stanley Fischer  had strongly supported changing the IMF Articles so as to 
mandate capital account liberalisation, Fischer, 2004, Chap 5). 
 
A creditor standstill was implemented in Korea in December 1997, for example, when IMF 
and G7 funding was insufficient to meet anticipated withdrawals until key banks were 
persuaded to rollover their credit lines. But it was Malaysia that put Krugman’s counsel to the 
test. The IMF Occasional Paper “Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery” describes the initiatives 
taken as follows: 
 
                                                 
18 This requires that ( )   21
0
1 1 *
1-
i Ei
s E
+⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , where 
 
2E  is the (higher) price of the dollar expected to 
prevail in period 2.  
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In September 1998, the Malaysian authorities launched a policy package 
designed to insulate monetary policy from external volatility. Measures included 
an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar and selected exchange and capital 
controls, complemented by a fiscal stimulus package that stepped up capital 
spending. These measures permitted the subsequent lowering of interest rates. 
The authorities also pursued fundamental reforms in the financial and corporate 
sectors, including a bank consolidation program and an upgrading of prudential 
regulation and supervision in line with international best practices. (Meesook et 
al., 2001) 
 
A time-shifted, differences-in-differences comparison of the course of events in Korea and 
Malaysia was conducted by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). They note that Malaysia recovered 
swiftly from crisis after the imposition of capital controls and conclude that it grew faster than it 
would if it had adopted an IMF programme as in South Korea and Thailand.19  
 
In principle, temporary capital controls could be used to implement the first-best monetary 
policy discussed above. Here is the logic. Assuming that, in the period of the crisis, the 
announcement of future tight money is not credible, higher interest rates for overseas 
investors in domestic currency would normally be needed to keep the current value of the 
dollar below its (higher) future expected level. But the domestic economy can be protected 
from rising interest rates by capital controls which tax the proceeds of investing in dollars, see 
Aghion et al. 2001 pp. 1131-2 for discussion. The arbitrage condition becomes: 
 
 *
21 11 (1 )(1 ) /i i c E E+ = + −            (3) 
 
where   2E to refer to the expected exchange rate in period 2 and 0<c<1 indicates the tax paid 
by domestic residents on their holdings of dollar assets.20 
 
After substitution, the asset market equilibrium is defined by: 
 
 
 *
2
1
1 2 2
1(1 )
1 ( , )
s
i ME c
i L Y i
+= − +        (4) 
 
where   2
s
M  refers to the expected money supply in period 2. Appropriate choice of c will shift 
the M-curve to the left as shown in Figure 5, keeping E1 at its pre-crisis level without any 
increase in i1. Subsequently, in period 2, capital controls can be removed and money credibly 
tightened. As c goes to 1, this will represent the extreme case of no capital mobility where the 
                                                 
19 See also Schiffrin reference. 
20 Alternatively, dividing through (3) by 1-c, one could interpret 1/(1-c) as reflecting a subsidy, where 
1+i1 is, as before, the net-of-subsidy cost of borrowing in domestic currency, while ( ) ( )11 / 1-i c+  is the 
higher gross rate received by lenders. In this case, capital controls permit the temporary rise in 
domestic rates needed to reassure foreign investors without affecting the domestic economy. 
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M-curve disappears (see Aghion et al. 2001, p. 1132) and the domestic authorities are free to 
set interest rates at any level and peg the exchange rate (as in Malaysia). 
 
Capital account liberalisation allows for high speed movements; such controls act like 
emergency brakes. Whether governments can switch capital controls on and off in this 
fashion without losing credibility is an interesting question: on which East Asian experience 
may throw some light.21 
 
(c) Debt restructuring (to make the S-curve vertical) 
 
As the dollar-denomination of debt lies at the heart of the balance sheet problem for private 
firms, relieving them of this debt burden should help. This was the motivation for cancelling 
the gold clause in US commercial debt in the time of President Roosevelt. He persuaded 
Congress to cancel the Gold Clause in debt contracts when the US left the Gold Standard in 
1933 and devaluation raised the dollar value of gold-denominated debt by about 70%; 
cancelling the Gold Clause kept dollar values unchanged.22  
 
The operation of a “Super-Chapter 11” to provide across-the-board relief to corporations with 
dollar debts as advocated by Joseph Stiglitz would have much the same effect, as discussed 
in Miller and Stiglitz (1999). A contemporary illustration is the pesification of all dollar debts 
(up to a threshold of 100,000 dollars) promulgated by President Duhalde in Argentina in 2002 
-- an action taken in conscious imitation of President Roosevelt, Sturzenegger (2003, p.48-
49). Baldi-Delatte (2005) argues that pesification played a key role in the post-crisis recovery 
of the Argentine economy.23 
 
In terms of the model being discussed, it is dollarisation of corporate debt that gives a 
negative slope to the S-curve: consequently de-dollarisation makes the S-curve vertical, i.e. 
independent of the price of the dollar. This, of course, is why it mitigates the risk of financial 
collapse.  
 
 
6. Alternative perspectives  
 
                                                 
21 The case for ex-ante inflow controls, like those used in Chile, has been articulated  by Levy-Yeyati 
(2005)  both as a pre-emptive measure to avoid the rapid build-up of speculative dollar liabilities and so  
that, in an panic, less-than-one-year investors cannot exit with all their assets. 
22 This abrogation was  “a key part of Roosevelt's first hundred days', providing the foundation for 
much of the New Deal policies directed at deflating the economy including departure of the US from 
the gold standard", Kroszner (2003, p.1). 
23 The Argentine case, however, provides a warning: relieving non-financial corporations of dollar 
debts at the cost of bank net worth may prove counterproductive by causing a credit crunch, Miller et 
al. (2005). 
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On ABB’s assumption that countries of South East Asia suffered idiosyncratic supply-side 
shocks which would reduce output some time after the exchange rate crisis, we have 
discussed the need for fiscal easing to check the immediate deficient-demand-led fall of 
output. This is, of course, a counter-factual exercise: output did fall sharply as “the sign of the 
growth rates changed” in the countries concerned. Imagine, nonetheless, that the necessary 
demand management policies had promptly been put in place. The result could have been 
the delayed step-down shown by the trend lines in Figure 1, without the immediate drop in 
output. 
 
There are, however, other possibilities that could be considered in future research. First that 
insulating domestic capital markets may help ensure macroeconomic stability; second that 
this may be at the cost of lower long-run growth. Both possibilities may be illustrated using 
GDP data from India, see Figure 6.  
 
Supply-side shock or capital-market crisis?  
 
Indian capital markets were kept relatively closed during in the 1990s and the country 
escaped the currency and output shocks suffered by many of its neighbours, Williamson 
(1999). Figure 6 shows little sign of any shift of potential in India at the time of the SE Asian 
crisis, as a single exponential trend seems to fit the data. The Indian experience suggests that 
successful stabilisation of output could have prevented any step-down in trend GDP. Could 
the supply contraction identified on the Blanchard/Quah criterion be endogenous -- due to the 
lagged effects of low investment and bankruptcy in a severe demand recession?24 On this 
interpretation, the contagion that spread from Thailand to Korea was not some irresistible 
strain of supply-side decline, but spreading exchange rate panic25 which, properly handled, 
could have avoided the hysteresis effects of a recession. The calculations of the costs of the 
crisis by Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk (2004) are, we believe, based on such an assumption. 
Treating the initiating shock not as a fall in productivity but as credit contraction induced by 
financial contagion might be more appropriate in such circumstances, Aghion and Banerjee 
(2005, p.108 ).   
 
                                                 
24 There was, for example, a pronounced step-down in trend output in the US as result of the Great 
Depression. 
25 With respect to the crises in Indonesia and Korea, ‘contagion seemed to play a dominant role. But the 
contagion hit economies with serious financial and corporate sector weaknesses.’ Fischer (2001, 
chapter 1, p. 11).  See also Fratzscher (2003).  
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Figure 6: Indian GDP
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors)
 
 
Crisis as the cost of progress? 
 
For some observers, however, capital market crises may be part of the cost of achieving 
faster growth. Ranciere et al. (2002, Abstract) note that ‘countries that have experienced 
occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial 
conditions’; and they illustrate by comparing Indian trend growth with that of Thailand.26 In 
their view, “financial liberalization policies that facilitate risk-taking increase leverage and 
investment: this leads to higher growth, but also to a greater incidence of crises.” Ennis and 
Keister (2003) provide an alternative analysis of financial development, financial crisis and 
long-run growth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee trace the impact of devaluation on domestic investment and 
the supply-side of the economy via the balance sheets of credit-constrained firms: and the 
possibility of self-fulfilling crisis they uncover could help explain why many emerging markets 
live in “fear of floating”. Exclusive focus on supply-side economic contraction is an 
unnecessary limitation of their analysis. Demand failure may also be part of the story, due to a 
lag in export demand substituting for falling investment orders in the midst of regional turmoil, 
for example; or to a credit crunch for a country suffering a ‘twin crisis’.  
 
                                                 
26 “GDP per capita grew by only 99% between 1980 and 2001 in India, whereas Thailand’s GDP per 
capita grew by 148%, despite having experienced a major crisis.” (Ranciere et al., 2002, p.1). 
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If this is the case, Tinbergen’s principle suggests complementing tight money with fiscal 
easing to maintain demand – a conclusion that the IMF itself appears to have drawn from the 
East Asian crisis27. In fact, first best policy in the ABB model requires credible promises of 
future tight money without high interest rates during the crisis. If this is not credible, fiscal and 
financial transfers and capital controls may be appropriate to shield the domestic economy 
from the impact of high rates.28 
  
The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate crisis management policies on the part of national 
governments or international agencies in the course of the SE-Asia crises of in 1997/8.29 The 
aim is to develop an eclectic framework in which balance sheet effects can impact both 
supply and demand. The dilemma facing the monetary authorities is given sharper focus; as 
is the case for complementary policy actions. 
 
 
                                                 
27 “What lessons have been drawn from these episodes? Certainly, that fiscal contraction may not be 
necessary in all balance of payments crises. If debt sustainability is not an issue, and if the contraction 
of domestic demand… combined with devaluation will produce a sustainable current account, then 
fiscal policy can be used counter-cyclically.” (Fischer, 2001, Chapter 1, p15.). 
28 Note that we are again appealing to Tinbergen’s principle and not simply arguing for lax monetary 
policy, Aghion and Banerjee (2005, p. 118). 
29 See the reports of the Independent Evaluation Office in the IMF for such analysis.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Malaysia and Thailand 
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Figure A.1:  Malaysian GDP.
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors) Seasonally adjusted using the independent pre-
crisis and post-crisis trend lines shown for calculating residuals (excluding crisis-affected period from 1997 Q3 to 1998 Q2).
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Figure A.2. Thai GDP
Source: IMF:IFS.  (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors). Seasonally adjusted using the independent pre-crisis and 
post-crisis trend lines shown for calculating residuals (excluding crisis-affected period from 1997 Q3 to 1998 Q2).
Devaluation
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B  Asset Market and Aggregate Supply schedules  
 
In more detail, the schedules are as follows. The M-curve – short for what ABB call the IPLM 
curve - is a combination of the Uncovered Interest Parity, money market equilibrium and the 
PPP condition for the second period. Formally, it is written as: 
  
*
2
1
1 2 2
1
1 ( , )
sMiE
i L Y i
+= +                           (B.1) 
 
where 1E is the exchange rate for the first period, 
*i is the foreign interest rate, 1i i1 and 2i  are 
domestic interest rates for periods 1 and 2, 2
sM  and 2Y  are money supply and output in 
period 2, and 2 2( , )L Y i  is the money demand function. This M-curve is downward sloping in 
the 1E  and 2Y  space because higher output in the second period increases money demand 
(i.e., higher L given interest rate in period 2) and so strengthens the exchange rate (note 
2
sM is given). 
 
The S-curve characterizes the supply of output on the assumption that entrepreneurs are 
credit-constrained and corresponds to what ABB call the W-curve. (The production function is 
assumed to be linear in capital stock, which depreciates completely at the end of the period.) 
Total investment consists of last-period retained earnings together with borrowing (in both 
domestic and foreign currencies, with proportions given exogenously) which is limited to a 
given fraction )( 1−tt iμ  of the retained earnings. The introduction of )( 1−tt iμ  (with 0'<tμ ) 
captures credit market imperfection. The S-curve is specifically given by 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+−−+= cc DD
P
EiDrYiY 1
1
1*
0112 1111 αμσ                      (B.2) 
where σ  is the productivity parameter, α  is the fraction of output consumed in each period, 
1D  is the total level of borrowing and 
cD  is its domestic currency component. The S-curve 
so constructed is a downward sloping straight line in 1E  and 2Y  space, for levels of output 
above recession30. Clearly, this formulation captures the contractionary effect of devaluation 
on the supply-side.  
 
Finally, equilibrium (Y2, E1) is given by any intersection of (B.1) and (B.2). Note that, because 
of the non-linearity of both schedules, multiple equilibria may well exist. 
 
C. Proof of Proposition 1 
                                                 
30 For convenience, ABB use Y2=0 to denote the recession level of output (which we label as YR in the 
text) and set Y2 =0 if the right hand side of (B.2) turns out to be negative. 
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Let equilibrium (Y2, E1) under our specification be given by the intersection of (B.1) and (B.2), 
with Y1 in (B.2) being replaced by the Keynesian demand given in equation (2) in the text. 
Then the proposition is true if an increase in i1 induces more leftward shift to Y2 in our 
specification than for ABB. Since the interest rate effects on Y2 are negative in both cases, 
this requires: 
            
 
Differentiating Y2 in (B.2) with respect to i1 (with Y1 replaced by 1
DY from (2)) yields 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
'
2 12 1
2 2 1
1 2 1 1
1 1
1
D
MFZ
iY YY i
i i i
μ σ μ αμ
∂ ∂= + + −∂ + ∂  
where the first term on the left hand side is what obtains for ABB’s specification, and the 
second term gives the additional effect arising because the output in period 1 is demand 
determined. As it is clear from equation (2) in the text that ∂ 1
DY  /∂i1 < 0, so the inequality 
above must hold.  
 
D. Implementing “first best” monetary policy in ABB 
 
Given that the money demand function satisfies: 
 
( , ) ( , )0;   0;    ( 0, ) 0t t t t t
t t
dL Y i dL Y i L Y i
dY di
> < = > , 
and that the productivity shock reduces output: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1' ' *2 1 1 0 1 2
1
1  1 1 1c cEY i Y r D i D D Y
P
σ μ α ⎡ ⎤= + − − + − + − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
(where 'σ  is the productivity parameter after the shock); 
then one can obtain '2M  implicitly from equation (B.1) as follows: 
'*
2
1 0'
1 2 2
1
1 ( , )
MiE E
i L Y i
+= =+                             
So '2M  is the expected money supply for period 2 which, if credibly announced in period 1, 
will keep the exchange rate stable at its pre-crisis level.  
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